March 5, 2025: One of the biggest areas of disruption unleashed by Trump 2.0 is the freezing of almost all US foreign aid. Hundreds of organizations and communities working on strengthening democracy, democratic institutions, human rights, rule of law, transparency, fighting corruption, etc. now risks seeing their work upended. A growing chorus of voices are being heard on the scale of disruption and the risks associated with such a dramatic change in American policy. Amidst all the chaos, there are writings and analysis trying to educate on how we may have arrived at this moment of crisis. The piece by Thomas Carothers at the Carnegie Endowmen for International Peace presents one point of view. Here is an excerpt:
At a general level, the Trump team’s aversion to democracy aid is part of its overall turn away from the long-standing bipartisan consensus that bolstering democracy’s global fortunes is a vital goal of U.S. foreign policy. Such a goal has no apparent place in a foreign policy defined by an America First transactional outlook that concentrates on striking economic and security deals with other countries, no matter their political regime type.
But a second, much more specific level of animus toward democracy aid also exists. Particular aspects of democracy aid appear to irritate at least four highly reactive nerve endings in the MAGA mind:
First, in the MAGA worldview, democracy aid is associated with “regime change” and “nation-building”—as manifested in the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq that cost so much blood and treasure for such limited results.
Second, some elements of democracy aid entail work on progressive goals that the Trump team is trying to eradicate from U.S. domestic and foreign policy. These are objectives like promoting gender equity, LGBTQ rights, racial and ethnic inclusion, and other parts of what Trump conservatives consider to be the universe of “woke” policy issues. Moreover, democracy frequently involves support for nongovernmental organizations, a category of institutions that some MAGA adherents equate with noxious liberal views. The explicit calling out of “civil society” within the administration’s attacks on aid underlines this viewpoint.
Third, small amounts of U.S. democracy aid have gone to a few countries led by MAGA friends, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, fueling a view among some in the Trump camp that democracy aid is about stopping right-wing populists from gaining or holding power and thus constitutes an additional form of “regime change” aimed at those leaders.
Fourth, programs seeking to help other countries combat disinformation in politics, especially Russian disinformation, have been included in the democracy aid portfolio in recent years. Combating disinformation touches a nerve among many U.S. conservatives, who conflate the issue with efforts to undermine the legitimacy of Trump’s 2016 victory or what they regard as censorship of conservative voices more generally.
The existential crisis facing the democracy aid community will be resolved—whether negatively or positively—as part of the debates and decisions about what sort of post-USAID reconstitution of foreign assistance the Trump administration carries out. More broadly, the precarious future of democracy aid is tied to the much deeper question of how radical a departure Trump foreign policy will be from the long line of predecessor policies that made support for global democracy an integral part of U.S. foreign policy, albeit inconsistently, out of the recognition that it contributes to America’s strength and security.
